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PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON AN 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE FOR LAW 
FIRMS:  WHEN A CURRENT CLIENT 
THREATENS TO SUE THE FIRM FOR 
MALPRACTICE, DOES THE PRIVILEGE APPLY 
TO THE FIRM’S CONSULTATION WITH IN-
HOUSE COUNSEL ABOUT THE POTENTIAL 
CLAIM? 
Edward J. Imwinkelried* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ideally, the attorney-client relationship is supposed to be cooperative 
and trusting.  On one side, the client approaches the attorney, describes 
his or her legal problem, and discloses their hoped-for outcome in the 
transaction or litigation.  In addition, the client reveals to the attorney all 
the facts relevant to the transaction or litigation.  For his or her part, after 
carefully evaluating the facts and researching the pertinent law, the 
attorney gives the client legal advice about the problem.  Trusting the 
attorney, the client accepts the attorney’s advice.  The client and attorney 
then work together to achieve the client’s desired outcome. 
Although the preceding paragraph describes the ideal, in many cases 
the ideal does not match the reality.  In numerous cases, to a degree, the 
relationship becomes adversary.1  The client either sues the attorney for 
malpractice or threatens to do so.2  For decades, the American Bar 
Association (“A.B.A.”) has closely monitored the number of malpractice 
claims filed against practitioners.  Its Standing Committee on Lawyers’ 
Professional Responsibility has collected data from attorneys’ liability 
insurers for 1985, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, and, most recently, 2011.3  The 
                                                 
* Edward L. Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California, Davis; former chair, 
Evidence Section, American Association of Law Schools; author, THE NEW WIGMORE: A 
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2010).  
The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Richard Underwood of the 
University of Kentucky School of Law and Mr. Charles Mokriski of the Proskauer firm who 
kindly assisted the author in the preparation of this Article. 
1 See, e.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 
S.E.2d 98, 109 (Ga. 2013) (recognizing that “once the relationship between the attorney and 
client develops into an adversarial one” certain privileges attach). 
2 Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1721, 1721 
(2005) (recognizing “the growing incidence of claims against lawyers”). 
3 JASON T. VAIL & KATHLEEN MARIE EWINS, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON 
LAWYERS’ PROF’L LIAB., PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 2008–2011, at 1 (2012). 
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most recent 2011 study covered 2008 through 2011, years affected by the 
“turbulent . . . adverse economic climate” in the United States.4  That 
study found that the total number of malpractice claims reported 
jumped by over 30% between 2007 and 2011.5  Many of the leading 
liability insurers have become so concerned that they strongly 
recommend to their insured law firms that the firm appoint an 
experienced in-house counsel to advise firm members on issues such as 
malpractice and compliance with ethical standards.6 
Suppose that during the representation of an outside client plaintiff, 
the trial judge dismisses one count in the complaint on the ground that 
the firm did not file the count stating that cause of action within the 
period of limitations.7  While the firm is seeking to persuade the judge to 
reconsider the ruling, the client expresses its displeasure with the ruling.  
The client does not immediately terminate the firm.  Yet, the client 
grumbles, suggesting that it is considering suing the firm for 
professional negligence.  At the suggestion of its liability insurer, the 
firm in question has designated one of its partners as in-house counsel.  
At this point the firm members representing the plaintiff consult with 
their in-house counsel about the potential malpractice claim.  The firm 
maintains internal records documenting the consultations. 
Several things are clear.  To begin, if a non-client subsequently 
sought discovery of the records, the case law would generally allow the 
client and the law firm to assert the privilege against the non-client.8  By 
way of example, assume that the defendant in the original lawsuit 
demanded that the firm produce the written communications between 
the firm members and the in-house counsel.  Both the firm and its 
outside client could object to production on the ground that the writings 
are privileged.9 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 See id. at 5 (stating that the participating insurers reported 40,486 claims in 2007 and 
52,982 claims in 2011). 
6 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1722, 1758–59. 
7 See Samson Habte, Law Firms Hopeful About Pending Rulings in Closely Watched 
‘Intrafirm Privilege’ Cases, 81 U.S. L. Wk. (BNA No. 47) 1760, 1761 (June 11, 2013), available at 
http://news.bna.com/lwln/LWLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=32048699&vname=lw1n
otallissues&jd=a0d9f2m7b4&split=0 (describing a similar hypothetical scenario discussed 
by a panel at the 39th American Bar Association (“A.B.A.”) National Conference of 
Professional Responsibility). 
8 See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1730–33 (providing a series of case illustrations on this 
issue).  “Taken together, the nonclient cases offer broad protection for in-firm 
communication under the attorney-client privilege.”  Id. at 1732. 
9 As holder, the client may assert the privilege in its own right; and the lawyer has 
implied authority to assert the privilege on the client’s behalf.  See 1 EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:  A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES 
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Suppose alternatively that the plaintiff client discharged the firm and 
either sued the firm for malpractice or threatened to do so.  In these 
circumstances, if the firm later consulted either its in-house counsel or 
another firm about the potential malpractice claim, the privilege would 
attach to the consultations.  The firm and its former client now stand in a 
normal adversarial relationship; and, after its termination by the outside 
client, the firm has a perfect right to seek counsel to prepare a defense 
against the former client’s malpractice claim.  However, one key issue is 
unsettled.  Suppose that while the firm continues to represent the outside 
client, the firm members representing the outside client consult the in-
house counsel about the potential malpractice suit and, after the 
termination of the relationship, the former client sues and seeks 
production of the writings reflecting the consultation.  In this variation of 
the fact situation, may the firm assert the attorney-client privilege against 
its former client? 
That issue has produced a sharp split of authority.  There are 
relatively few published decisions on point to provide a firm with 
guidance.10  Worse still, the authorities are badly divided.11  “For over 
two decades, courts routinely rejected law firms’ efforts to shield internal 
communications about potential malpractice liability from their 
clients.”12  However, beginning in the mid-1990s, a counter-trend 
developed.13  In 2013, two state courts, the Georgia Supreme Court and 
                                                                                                             
§ 6.5.3, at 664–65 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed. 2010) (discussing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Swidler & Berlin v. United States to illustrate this point). 
10 See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1723 (“There are, so far, three cases on the 
subject . . . .”); Cathryn M. Sadler, Note, The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to 
Communications Between Lawyers Within the Same Firm:  Evaluating United States v. Rowe, 30 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 859, 860, 872–73 (1998) (denoting “a lack of authority” on this issue and 
providing some limited case illustrations); Gail Diane Cox, Court Expands Client Privilege:  
Associates Are Deemed Counsel for Their Own Firms, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 1996, at A6 (denoting 
a ‘“dearth of authority’” on the issue based on commentary rather than precedent).  In RFF 
Family Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, the court remarked that it found itself in 
relatively “‘uncharted jurisprudential waters.’”  991 N.E.2d 1066, 1070 (Mass. 2013) 
(quoting Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C. v. St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 730 S.E.2d 
608 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)). 
11 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 
104 (Ga. 2013) (discussing the divide in case law over a law firm’s ability to claim attorney-
client privilege for communications with its in-house counsel). 
12 Habte, supra note 7, at 1761. 
13 See Sadler, supra note 10, at 860 (“United States v. Rowe, was one of the first cases to 
tackle the issue of intra-firm privilege . . . finding that communications between lawyers 
within a firm could be protected by the [attorney-client] privilege.” (footnote omitted)).  
The Ninth Circuit handed down the decision in Rowe in 1996.  United States v. Rowe, 96 
F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,14 joined the ranks of the 
minority of jurisdictions permitting the firm to assert the privilege 
against its former client.15 
At first blush, a non-lawyer might be outraged at the notion of 
allowing a law firm to shield documents generated during its 
representation of an outside client from that client.  It may appear that 
the firm’s ethical duty of loyalty to a current client should trump the 
firm’s evidentiary privilege.  However, the thesis of this Article is that 
the Georgia and Massachusetts courts came to the right result. 
Part II of this Article is descriptive, surveying the current split of 
authority.16  In contrast, Part III and Part IV of the Article are 
evaluative.17 Part III addresses the merits of the threshold policy 
question of whether a law firm should ever be permitted to invoke the 
attorney-client privilege to shield in-house consultations about a client’s 
potential malpractice claim from the outside client.18  Part III argues that 
the courts subscribing to the majority view have misconstrued the case 
law on the so-called fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.19  
Part III concludes that at least in some circumstances, a firm has the right 
to invoke the privilege against its former client.20 
Next, Part IV attempts to define the circumstances in which courts 
should uphold an intra-firm privilege against a former client.21  In 
particular, Part IV analyzes the thorny question of whether the privilege 
attaches to the firm’s in-house consultations even when the firm engages 
in such consultations without the outside client’s consent.22  Part IV 
contends that the courts requiring the outside client’s consent have 
misconceived an evidence issue as an ethics question.23 
This Article does not purport to offer a definitive resolution of these 
issues.  Given the paucity of authority on point and the most recent 
decisions from Georgia and Massachusetts, it would be presumptuous to 
                                                 
14 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 746 S.E.2d at 102; RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1067–
68. 
15 See RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1078–79 (citing other jurisdictions’ decisions 
on the issue and explaining its opposing conclusion); Robert L. Byman, So, You’ve Screwed 
Up.  Now What? NAT’L L.J., (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=12 
02637723731/So-Youve-Screwed-Up-Now-What%3Fmcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL 
(discussing the Georgia and Massachusetts decisions). 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Parts III–IV. 
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Part III.A. 
20 See infra Part III.B. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 See infra Part IV.B. 
23 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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claim to be able to do so.  However, the prevalence of legal malpractice 
claims makes these issues critical to both the bar and its clientele.  The 
intent of this Article is to promote a deeper, more robust debate between 
the proponents of the traditional majority and emerging minority views. 
II.  A DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT SPLIT OF AUTHORITY OVER THE 
QUESTION OF THE FIRM’S RIGHT TO ASSERT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE FOR ITS IN-HOUSE CONSULTATIONS ABOUT A POTENTIAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIM BY A THEN CURRENT CLIENT 
As Part I noted, there is presently a split of authority over the issue 
of a firm’s ability to invoke the attorney-client privilege to shield in-
house consultations about a possible malpractice action by a then current 
client.  First, Part II.A discusses the traditional view denying the firm the 
right to assert the privilege.24  Second, Part II.B explains the minority 
view giving the firm the right to assert the privilege.25 
A. The Traditional, Majority View Denying the Firm the Right to Assert the 
Privilege Against Its Former Outside Client 
The majority view is that the firm cannot assert the attorney-client 
privilege against its former client.26  For decades, “[a] nearly unbroken 
line of cases” adopted this view.27  Some of these cases went to the length 
of announcing that the firm could not invoke the privilege against the 
former client “under any circumstances.”28  First, this section discusses 
state authority in this regard.29  It then goes on to explain the federal 
authority supporting this view.30 
1. State Authority 
There is both state and federal support for the majority view.  A 
depublished California decision, McCormick v. Superior Court,31 illustrates 
many courts’ reluctance to allow a privilege to attach to a firm’s in-house 
                                                 
24 See infra Part II.A. 
25 See infra Part II.B. 
26 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1076–77 (Mass 
2013).  
27 Habte, supra note 7, at 1761. 
28 E.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 
98, 104 (Ga. 2013). 
29 See infra Part II.A.1. 
30 See infra Part II.A.2. 
31 McCormick v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (depublished). 
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consultations against a then current client.32  In McCormick, the client, 
Nelson, made noises suggesting that he might sue the firm.33  At that 
juncture, the firm hired and consulted with outside counsel about the 
potential claim.34  In addition, the firm members working on Nelson’s 
case consulted with Whitney, a member of the firm’s own management 
committee.35  Nelson subsequently sued the firm.36  During pretrial 
discovery, Nelson demanded production of a number of the firm’s 
documents.37  The requested documents included writings reflecting 
consultations between the firm members representing Nelson and 
Whitney.38  The firm cited the attorney-client privilege as the basis for its 
refusal to produce.39  To support its objection, the firm submitted 
Whitney’s declaration to the effect that Whitney and the consulting firm 
members created the documents “for the ultimate use of [the firm] in 
representing its own interests and other counsel ultimately retained by 
[the firm] in the event that [the client] did file a lawsuit.”40 
The intermediate appellate court in California rejected the firm’s 
argument.41  The court professed that it could not understand how the 
firm could simultaneously be both the attorney for Nelson and a client 
with a privilege against Nelson:  “If the McCormick firm was the client, 
who was its lawyer?  And who was the client communicating with?”42  
The court characterized the firm’s position as a contention that “its 
internally generated documents [were] . . . privileged ‘communications’ 
with its lawyer, i.e., with itself.”43  Instead, the court concluded that the 
communications between Whitney and the firm members working on 
Nelson’s case did not qualify as “confidential communications between a 
client and a client’s lawyer.”44 
It is true that in some passages, the court seemed to stop short of 
adopting a sweeping holding that a firm could never invoke a privilege 
against a litigant who was a firm client at the time of the 
                                                 
32 See Barbara S. Gillers, Preserving the Attorney Client Privilege for Advice of a Law Firm’s 
In-House Counsel, 2000 PROF. LAW.:  SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 107, 110–11 (2000) (discussing the 
court’s holding in McCormick). 
33 Id. at 110. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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communications.45  However, in other passages the court employed 
broad language implying that the court would never entertain an 
attorney-client privilege claim for intra-firm communications about a 
potential malpractice claim by a then current client.46 
2. Federal Authority 
There are also several federal opinions lending support to the 
majority view.47  One of the most cited federal opinions is the 1989 
decision by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Sunrise Security 
Litigation.48  Sunrise was the seminal decision applying the so-called 
“fiduciary duty exception” to the privilege in this context.49  In Sunrise, a 
law firm had represented a failed savings and loan association 
(Sunrise).50  The firm was joined as a defendant with the association in an 
action by both the association’s former shareholders and the 
government.51  When the plaintiffs sought production of some of the 
firm’s internal work documents concerning the firm’s representation of 
the association, the firm objected on privilege grounds.52 
Unlike the McCormick court, the court was willing to accept the 
generalization that “‘a law firm may consult its own attorneys as house 
counsel to secure legal advice in connection with or related to the firm’s 
representation of a client, and as a result obtain the protection of the 
attorney client privilege on the basis that it is its own client.’”53  The 
court stated that it was “not willing to hold that a law firm may never 
make privileged communications with [its own] in house counsel.”54  
However, the court then carved out an important exception to the 
generalization—citing the state rule modeled after A.B.A. Model Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 1.7 on a lawyer’s duty of loyalty, the court 
asserted that applying the privilege to the firm’s in-house consultations 
                                                 
45 See id. at 111 (noting the court’s remark that the firm had not taken any clear, 
definitive steps to sufficiently differentiate normal intra-firm communications from the 
communications between Whitney and the firm members representing Nelson). 
46 See id. at 110 (“If the McCormick firm was the client, who was its lawyer?  And who 
was the client communicating with?”). 
47 See, e.g., Thelen Reid & Priest LLP v. Marland, No. C 06-2071 VRW, 2007 WL 578989, 
at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2007) (refusing to follow a strict rule “requiring disclosure of all 
communications relating to a client”). 
48 130 F.R.D. 560 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
49 Habte, supra note 7, at 1761. 
50 Sadler, supra note 10, at 871. 
51 Id.; In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562. 
52 In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 562–63. 
53 Id. at 594–95. 
54 Id. at 595. 
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could conflict with the firm’s fiduciary duty to the then current client.55  
The court stated that given the firm’s ethical duties, the privilege would 
not attach to “communications or legal advice in which [the firm’s] 
representation of itself violated Rule 1.7.”56  In the court’s mind, if the 
firm’s in-house consultation created a conflict of interest between the 
firm’s interests and those of the outside client, the privilege must yield.  
As in the case of the McCormick decision, the Sunrise opinion mentioned 
facts suggesting a more limited holding.57  However, the Sunrise court’s 
assertion of the fiduciary exception was so forceful that the exception 
seemed expansive enough to virtually swallow up the generalization. 
After Sunrise, “the current-client issue lay dormant until two cases 
decided in 2002.”58  One decision was Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit 
Lyonnaise (Suisse), S.A.59  The firm, Rogers & Wells, represented Credit 
Lyonnaise (CL) in certain oil transactions and related litigation.60  During 
the representation, CL told Rogers & Wells that if CL were found liable 
in the litigation, in turn CL would attempt to hold Rogers & Wells 
liable.61  After CL’s statement, the firm member heading Roger & Wells’ 
Clients and Ethics Committee conducted an interval review of the firm’s 
representation of CL.62  Later CL fired Rogers & Wells and sued the firm 
for malpractice.63  In the suit, CL sought production of the documents 
reflecting the firm’s internal review.64  As in McCormick and Sunrise, the 
firm cited the attorney-client privilege as a ground for objecting to the 
production request.65 
The court overruled the objection.66  The court relied on Sunrise as 
precedent.67  The court reasoned that since CL “was still its client” at the 
time of the internal review, the firm was “in no position to claim a 
privilege against their client.  While the privilege will be applicable 
against all the world, it cannot be maintained against” CL.68  The court 
                                                 
55 Id. at 595 & n.8. 
56 Id. at 597; see Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1735–36 (quoting the court and providing a 
summary of the court’s reasoning). 
57 See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750 (“In In re Sunrise . . . firm in-house counsel had an 
obvious conflict of interest under Rule 1.7 because the lawyers who acted as so-called firm 
counsel were mostly the same lawyers who represented the outside client.”). 
58 Id. at 1736. 
59 220 F. Supp. 2d 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
60 Id. at 284. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 285. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 286. 
66 Id. at 288. 
67 Id. at 287. 
68 Id. 
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underscored the firm’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to its outside client at 
the time of the in-house consultation.69  The court asserted flatly that “a 
law firm cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege against a current 
client when performing a conflict check in furtherance of representing 
that client.”70  Once again, some commentators have argued that the Bank 
Brussels ruling could be limited to the peculiar facts of the case.71  
However, on its face the opinion reads as a ringing endorsement of the 
fiduciary duty exception announced in Sunrise.72 
The second noteworthy 2002 decision was Koen Book Distributors v. 
Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C.73  The plaintiff 
book company had hired the defendant firm for advice pertaining to a 
security interest from one of the company’s customers, Crown Books 
Corporation.74  When Crown Books filed for bankruptcy, the firm 
represented Koen in the bankruptcy proceedings.75  However, Koen 
became dissatisfied with the quality of the firm’s services and informed 
the firm that it was considering filing a malpractice action.76  Ultimately, 
Koen terminated the firm’s services in mid-August 2001.77  However, in 
the interim the firm’s lawyers representing Koen consulted another firm 
member about the “ethical and legal issues that had arisen out of the 
                                                 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 288. 
71 E.g., Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1750–51.  Professor Chambliss has proposed two 
different bases for a narrow reading of the holding.  One is that the firm member who 
headed the Clients and Ethics Committee “was not formally designated or compensated as 
in-house counsel.”  Id. at 1750.  The second is that the facts suggest that one of the purposes 
of the consultation was the unethical objective of concealing the conflict from the client.  Id. 
at 1751.  If that had been the firm’s objective, the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-
client privilege might come into play.  Id.  See generally 2 EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE 
NEW WIGMORE:  A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.13.2.d, at 1166–99 
(2d ed. 2010) (providing an in-depth overview of the crime-fraud exception). 
72 Given the nature of the fact situation, the reader might wonder why the court did not 
uphold the privilege on the ground that the party seeking discovery was a non-party.  As 
Part I pointed out, as a general proposition even the courts rejecting the assertion of the 
privilege against the client at the time of the communication ordinarily sustain privilege 
claims against third parties.  See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732–33 (explaining the scope 
of the privilege regarding non-clients).  However, as previously stated, one of the plaintiffs 
in the instant case was a group of shareholders.  The courts sometimes treat shareholders as 
representatives of the corporate entity.  Id. at 1733–34 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 
1093 (5th Cir. 1970)).  Thus, since the defendant had represented the corporate entity, the 
court might have conceived the case as a dispute between representatives of the client (the 
shareholders) and the client’s attorney (the law firm). 
73 212 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
74 Id. at 284. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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portent of a malpractice action.”78  Those consultations generated a 
number of internal firm documents.79  Koen later sued the firm for 
malpractice.80  During discovery, Koen demanded that the firm produce 
those documents.81  The firm resisted, citing the attorney-client privilege 
as the justification for its refusal.82 
Like the other 2002 decision, Bank Brussels, the Koen court turned to 
Sunrise as authority.83  The court declared: 
[A] law firm owes a fiduciary duty to a client and may 
not engage in conflicting representations absent the 
exceptions set forth in Rule 1.7 of the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Otherwise, to the extent 
that the seeking or obtaining of legal advice by one 
lawyer from another lawyer inside the firm “implicates 
or creates a conflict of interest,” the attorney-client 
privilege between the lawyers is vitiated.84 
According to the court, the conflict negates the privilege.85  The court 
found that the firm was “engaged in a conflict of interest . . . when it was 
receiving information from and/or providing legal advice to several of 
its lawyers while at the same time continuing to represent” Koen.86  
Weighing the competing interests of the client and firm, the court 
decided that the firm’s fiduciary duty to its client was “paramount.”87  
The court acknowledged that its ruling placed the firm “in an unenviable 
situation.”88  However, the court reasoned that if the firm neither 
withdrew from representing the outside client nor obtained the client’s 
consent to the in-house consultations about the client’s potential claim, 
the firm had to “forego the benefit of the attorney-client 
privilege . . . during this period.”89 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 284–85. 
84 Id. at 285 (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Sunrise Sec. Litigation, 130 F.R.D. 560, 597 
(E.D. Pa. 1989)). 
85 E.g., St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 
98, 103 (Ga. 2013). 
86 Koen, 212 F.R.D. at 285–86. 
87 Id. at 286. 
88 Id. 
89 Id.; see Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1739 (“The court noted that, once the client 
threatened to sue, the firm could have tried to withdraw or sought the client’s consent for 
its in-firm consultation, but the firm did neither.  Thus, as long as the firm continued to 
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A more recent federal decision in this line of authority is the 2008 
bankruptcy court decision in In re Sonic Blue Inc.90  There the court 
affirmed the majority Sunrise view with a rhetorical flourish: 
[W]hen a law firm chooses to represent itself, it runs the 
risk that the representation may create an impermissible 
conflict of interest with one of more of its current clients.  
In light of these ethical concerns, the courts that have 
considered the issue have resoundingly found that, 
where conflicting duties exist, the law firm’s right to 
claim privilege must give way to the interest in 
protecting current clients who may be harmed by the 
conflict . . . . As a result, a law firm cannot assert the 
attorney-client privilege against a current outside client 
when the communications that it seeks to protect arise 
out of self-representation that creates an impermissible 
conflicting relationship with that outside client.91 
B. The Growing Minority View 
Although the Sonic Blue court declared in 2008 that “the courts that 
have considered the issue have resoundingly” affirmed the majority 
view,92 even at that time the assertion was an overstatement.  There was 
contrary federal authority then,93 and in 2013 two state supreme courts 
opted to embrace the minority view.94 
1. Federal Authority 
The leading federal authority is the 1996 decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rowe.95  Rowe, a named 
senior partner at a San Diego law firm, began to suspect that one of its 
attorneys had mishandled client funds.96  He then tasked two young 
associates to investigate the suspected misconduct.97  Rowe exchanged 
                                                                                                             
represent the client, the court held that the firm could not maintain any privilege against 
the client.” (footnote omitted)). 
90 No. 03-51775, 2008 WL 170562 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2008); see also RFF Family P’ship, LP 
v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1076–77 (Mass. 2013) (discussing In re Sonic 
Blue Inc.). 
91 In re Sonic Blue Inc., 2008 WL 170562, at *9. 
92 Id. 
93 See infra Part II.B.1. 
94 See infra Part II.B.2. 
95 96 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 1996). 
96 Id. at 1295. 
97 Id. 
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oral communications with the associates about the investigation.98  A 
grand jury later undertook an investigation into the misconduct and 
subpoenaed the associates.99  In response, the associates asserted the 
firm’s attorney-client privilege.100 
The district court rejected the associates’ claim.101  The judge 
expressed unease about her ruling.102  Nevertheless, she ordered the 
associates to testify: 
According to the judge, who had spoken to the 
associates in camera, “Basically, they were trusted 
young associates [who] were asked to do some leg work 
and come up with information . . . . [T]hey 
were . . . helping out.”  The judge noted that the 
associates were never told they were working as the 
firm’s attorneys; that they didn’t bill the firm or record 
hours expended on the firm’s behalf; and that, because 
they were far less experienced than Rowe, “[t]hey were 
certainly taking direction from him.”103 
Rowe and the firm appealed from the district court order.104 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.105  At the outset of his 
analysis, Judge Kozinski rejected two distinctions proposed by the 
United States.106  First, the court held that a firm may invoke the 
attorney-client privilege whether it consults in-house or an outside 
firm.107  Next, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Upjohn Co. 
v. United States,108 the court brushed aside the government’s contention 
that the lawyer’s conduct of a factual investigation does not constitute 
the rendition of “professional legal services.”109 
Having repudiated those proposed distinctions, Judge Kozinski 
found that Rowe and the associates had made out a plausible case that 
the privilege attached.110  Although they were in-house counsel, the 
                                                 
98 Id. at 1295–96. 
99 Id. at 1295. 
100 Id. at 1296. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1298. 
106 Id. at 1296–97. 
107 Id. at 1296. 
108 Id. at 1296–97 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1297. 
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associates could qualify as counsel for the firm as a client.111  The court 
conceded that the retention of outside counsel might make it easier for a 
firm to show that it anticipated litigation; but on the facts in Rowe, “it 
[was] clear that litigation was anticipated.”112  Thus, there was a 
sufficient inference that the firm had initially sought counsel, that is, the 
associates, for legal advice.113  Further, since Rowe had asked the 
associates to “‘sift[] through the facts with an eye to the legally 
relevant,’” the associates were acting in their capacity as attorneys for the 
firm during their subsequent investigation.114  The Ninth Circuit 
remanded to the district court for further factual findings rather than 
finally upholding the privilege claim.115  However, the court made it 
clear that at least in certain circumstances, a firm may assert the privilege 
to protect intra-firm communications about the potential malpractice 
claim of a person who was an outside client of the firm at the very time 
of the communications.116 
While the Rowe decision antedated Sonic Blue, three years after Sonic 
Blue another federal court departed from the majority view.  In 2011, a 
federal District Court in Ohio handed down its decision in TattleTale 
Alarm Systems, Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP.117  The court argued 
that the majority view has undesirable consequences.118  According to 
the court, the majority view creates a significant disincentive for firm 
members to consult with more experienced in-house counsel about 
“rectif[ying] [an error] before the client is irreparably damaged.  If such 
lawyers believe that these communications will eventually be revealed to 
the client in the context of a legal malpractice case, they will be much less 
likely to seek prompt advice from members of the same firm.”119  In the 
court’s view, in many if not most cases, immediate consultation with 
experienced in-house counsel is likely to benefit the outside client.120  
Especially when the firm has designated in-house counsel for these 
                                                 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 1296. 
113 Id. at 1297 (“[H]e asked lawyers—not secretaries, paralegals, librarians or other of the 
firm’s employees—to conduct the investigation . . . [thus] he is justified in expecting that 
communications with these lawyers will be privileged.”). 
114 Id. (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390–91 (1981)). 
115 Id. at 1297–98. 
116 Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; see Sadler, supra note 10, at 861–64 (discussing the Rowe 
opinion). 
117 No. 2:10-cv-226, 2011 WL 382627 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011); see also RFF Family P’ship, 
LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Mass. 2013) (discussing TattleTale 
Alarm Sys.). 
118 See infra text accompanying note 119 (presenting the court’s argument). 
119 2011 WL 382627, at *5. 
120 Id. 
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purposes, the firm’s lawyers “should be encouraged to seek advice 
promptly.”121  The veteran in-house counsel’s advice may enable the firm 
members representing the outside client to moot the malpractice issue by 
devising a better strategy to prevail for the client in the litigation or 
transaction.  The court implicitly criticized the Bank Brussels opinion, 
stating that if the firm had to withdraw and seek its own outside counsel, 
it may be too late to protect the [outside] client from damage.122  The 
upshot is that as of 2011, there was a sharp split of authority over this 
issue among the federal courts. 
2. State Authority 
Two 2013 decisions—rendered within a day of each other—added to 
the momentum toward the minority view.  On July 10, 2013, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court handed down its decision in RFF 
Partnership, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP.123  RFF contemplated making a 
loan secured by what RFF thought would be a first mortgage on certain 
real property.124  RFF hired the firm to investigate the property to ensure 
that RFF could foreclose on the property if the borrower defaulted.125  
When the borrower defaulted, RFF sued to foreclose; but, its foreclosure 
action was enjoined when the assignee of another mortgage on the same 
property claimed that its mortgage was superior to RFF’s.126  While the 
firm was still representing RFF and seeking to obtain judicial 
authorization of the foreclosure, RFF hired another law firm, Prince 
Lobel Tye LLP.127  Prince sent the firm a notice that RFF considered the 
firm guilty of malpractice on the ground that the firm had failed to 
discover the existing, prior mortgage.128  At that point, the firm’s 
attorneys representing RFF consulted with Rosenblatt, a firm partner 
who had been designated to respond to ethical and risk management 
issues.129  RFF later sued the firm for malpractice.130 
                                                 
121 Id.  It is true that, in Rowe, the in-house counsel were relatively inexperienced 
associates.  See supra text accompanying note 97 (characterizing the in-house counsel as 
young associates).  However, firms’ liability insurers are now pressuring them to appoint 
experienced counsel to advise junior firm members on matters of legal ethics and risk 
management, including malpractice claims.  See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1721–22 
(explaining that using in-house counsel promotes better risk management and lowers the 
cost of liability insurance). 
122 TattleTale Alarm Sys., 2011 WL 382627, at *5. 
123 991 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass. 2013). 
124 Id. at 1068. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 1068–69. 
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When RFF noticed the deposition of the firm attorneys who had 
represented RFF, the firm sought a protective order.131  The firm 
contended that its attorney-client privilege protected any 
communications between Rosenblatt and the firm attorneys representing 
RFF about RFF’s potential malpractice claim.132  When the trial judge 
entered the protective order, RFF appealed to the intermediate appellate 
court.133  Since the Supreme Judicial Court believed that the case posed 
an important issue, by its own motion the court transferred the case to its 
docket.134 
On appeal, RFF essentially asked the court to adopt the position 
endorsed by Koen.135  As the Supreme Judicial Court stated: 
RFF argues that when an attorney in a law firm seeks 
legal advice from in-house counsel regarding how the 
attorney or the firm should respond to a claim or 
threatened claim of malpractice brought by a current 
client, these communications are not protected from 
disclosure to the client unless the law firm, before seeking 
the advice, has either withdrawn from the 
representation or fully disclosed to the client that the 
law firm and client have a conflict of interest and 
obtained the client’s informed consent for the law firm 
to seek legal advice.136 
After stating RFF’s argument, the court proceeded to reject the 
argument based on policy and precedent.  As a matter of policy, the 
court agreed with TattleTale that the minority view encourages firm 
members to seek advice from more experienced firm members about 
potential malpractice claims and encouraging such conduct is in outside 
clients’ interest.137  The court drew upon the assertion in TattleTale that 
firm members who fear they may have harmed an outside client’s 
interest ought to consult senior firm members who “may be better 
schooled in ethical rules, and will almost certainly be better capable of 
dispassionate analysis of the problem at hand.”138  Like the TattleTale 
                                                                                                             
130 Id. at 1069. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1069–70. 
134 Id. at 1070. 
135 Id. at 1075. 
136 Id. at 1070. 
137 Id. at 1072 (citing TattleTale Alarm Sys., Inc. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, LLP, No. 
2:10-cv-226, 2011 WL 382627, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 3, 2011)). 
138 Id. at 1073. 
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court, the Supreme Judicial Court doubted that firm members would 
routinely consult senior firm counsel for this purpose if the members 
realized that “the consultation may not remain private.”139 
The court then undertook an analysis of the precedent governing the 
fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege.  The court stated that, 
in the typical situation in which a trustee uses trust funds to pay for an 
attorney’s advice about trust management, “‘the beneficiaries [are] the 
“real clients,”’” and the trustee therefore may not invoke the privilege to 
prevent the beneficiaries from discovering the contents of the 
communications between the trustee and the attorney.140  The court 
noted that in 2011 in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation,141 the U.S. 
Supreme Court indicated that the trustee cannot invoke the privilege 
against the beneficiary “when a trustee obtained legal advice to guide 
the administration of the trust, and not for the trustee’s own defense in 
litigation.”142 
However, the Supreme Judicial Court distinguished the atypical case 
where after a credible threat of litigation between the trustee and 
beneficiaries has arisen, the trustee seeks legal advice to prepare a 
defense and pays the lawyer.143  Although a person may have freely 
agreed to serve as a trustee, he or she “‘is not completely debilitated’” 
from taking steps “‘to defend’” himself or herself.144  A person does not 
render himself or herself defenseless by agreeing to become a trustee.  
The court noted that like a trustee, a lawyer has a right to self-defense.145  
Indeed, A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6 even permits the lawyer to disclose the 
client’s otherwise privileged communications when necessary to 
establish the lawyer’s defense.146 
In its next breath, though, the court imposed limitations on the scope 
of the firm’s privilege for in-house consultations.  Specifically, the court 
prescribed “four conditions”:  (1) the law firm must formally or 
informally designate the attorney or attorneys within the firm who will 
“represent the firm in matters as in-house or ethics counsel;” (2) the 
attorney representing the firm must not have performed any work on the 
outside client’s case or a substantially related matter; (3) the attorney’s 
                                                 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1075 (quoting United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2322 
(2011)). 
141 131 S. Ct. 2313 (2011). 
142 RFF Family P’ship, LP, 991 N.E.2d at 1074 (quoting Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. at 
2321)). 
143 Id. at 1075. 
144 Id. (quoting United States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
145 Id. at 1078–79. 
146 Id. at 1079. 
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time investigating the potential claim against the firm must be billed to 
the firm rather than the outside client; and (4) the communications 
between the attorneys representing the outside client and the in-house 
counsel must be made in confidence and kept confidential.147 
The very next day, July 11, 2013, the Georgia Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & 
Dunn, P.C.148  Like the RFF case, St. Simons adopts the minority view.149  
St. Simon Waterfront (“SSW”) was interested in developing a 
commercial real estate venture.150  SSW hired the firm to perform the 
legal work related to the venture, including drafting the standard form 
purchase contract.151  However, after a number of prospective buyers 
had signed the contract, they notified SSW that they intended to rescind 
because of several “alleged defects in the purchase contract.”152  In a 
February 2008 conference call between SSW and the firm, SSW indicated 
that it blamed the firm for the rescissions and would seek to hold it 
responsible for any damages.153  After the call, the participating firm 
members contacted Arnold Young, the firm’s in-house general 
counsel.154  While the firm continued representing SSW, the firm 
members representing SSW communicated with Young about SSW’s 
potential malpractice claim.155  In 2009, SSW sued the firm for 
malpractice.156  In the pretrial discovery phase, SSW attempted to depose 
firm members concerning the in-house consultations about the 
malpractice claim and demanded the production of documents reflecting 
the consultations.157  The firm objected on the basis of the attorney-client 
privilege and filed a privilege log supporting the objection.158 
The trial judge overruled the objection.159  Following the majority 
view, the judge reasoned that the in-house consultations created a 
conflict of interest between the outside client’s and firm’s interests and 
                                                 
147 Id. at 1080. 
148 746 S.E.2d 98 (Ga. 2013). 
149 See id. at 104 (discussing a number of authorities reaching the opposite result). 
150 Id. at 102. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 102–03. 
159 Id. at 103. 
Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
732 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
that the conflict “negated” the privilege.160  The firm appealed, and the 
case eventually reached the state supreme court.161 
After describing the procedural setting and the underlying facts, the 
court acknowledged that there was a split of authority on the issue; and, 
in its survey of the case law, the court identified three competing 
views.162  The views span a wide spectrum:  (1) one extreme position is 
that the firm cannot claim a privilege against the outside client “under 
any circumstances” if the attorney-client relationship with the client 
existed at the time of the in-house consultations; (2) other courts hold 
that “the privilege applies only in limited circumstances,” which include 
such procedural safeguards as notifying the outside client of the fact of 
the ongoing, in-house consultations; and (3) still another view is that 
“the privilege does apply or that it applies with narrow exceptions.”163 
Rather than formally adopting any of the competing views, the court 
announced that “the best course is simply to analyze the privilege issue 
here as we would in any other lawsuit in which the privilege is 
asserted.”164  Like the RFF court, the court described the steps that the 
firm should take to establish that the firm itself has become a client 
entitled to the protection of the privilege.  The court indicated the 
following:  The attorney advising the firm members representing the 
outside client should not participate in the underlying representation; 
the attorney ought to open a new file separate from the files for the 
outside client’s case; the attorney must bill his or her time to the firm, not 
the outside client; and the firm should designate the attorney as firm in-
house counsel with some “level of formality.”165  The court stated that 
the ideal structural arrangement is one in which the designated counsel 
“holds a full-time position as firm counsel to the exclusion of other 
work.”166  The court stated that if the firm observed these practices, the 
firm members could be deemed representatives of the firm as a client 
consulting the in-house lawyer; the members would not be considered as 
merely “consulting with a colleague as part of their representation of [an 
outside] client or discussing general firm business.”167  If the firm follows 
that practice, the firm would then have an opportunity to make a 
                                                 
160 Id.   
161 Id. 
162 See id. at 104 (discussing several cases on the topic). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 105. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 105 & n.3. 
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showing that all the normal requirements for the privilege, such as 
confidentiality, have been satisfied.168 
In the second half of the opinion, the court grappled with the tension 
between the privilege and the firm’s ethical responsibilities to the outside 
client.  The court conceded that some courts had concluded that those 
ethical duties trump the firm’s entitlement to the attorney-client 
privilege.169  The court referred to the Koen theory that a fiduciary 
exception precludes the firm from asserting the privilege for 
communications relating to a potential malpractice claim by a then 
current client.170 
However, the court advanced two counter-arguments.  The first was 
that evidentiary and ethical rules can differ.171  In the court’s words, “this 
opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical quandary and instead 
addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege.”172  The court 
pointed to “our State Bar’s admonition that the Rules of Professional 
Conduct are not intended to affect the law of privilege.”173  Assuming 
that there is a fiduciary exception in legal ethics, the court “decline[d] to 
adopt the fiduciary exception to the attorney-client privilege in this 
context.”174  The court’s second counter-argument was that the firm is 
not guilty of any unethical conduct unless the firm endeavors to mislead 
the outside client about the in-house consultations.175  In dictum, the 
court stated that “to the extent there is an allegation that in-house 
counsel has been employed by firm attorneys in an effort to defraud 
rather than merely defend against a client, the privilege” would be 
unavailable.176  There was no such allegation in the Georgia case. 
III.  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE THRESHOLD POLICY QUESTION OF 
WHETHER A FIRM SHOULD EVER ENJOY A PRIVILEGE PROTECTING INTERNAL 
CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN IN-HOUSE COUNSEL AND THE COUNSEL 
REPRESENTING A CURRENT CLIENT WHO HAS INDICATED THAT IT MAY SUE 
THE FIRM FOR MALPRACTICE 
In Part II, this Article demonstrated that the courts are sharply 
divided over the questions of whether, and in what circumstances, a law 
                                                 
168 Id. at 106. 
169 Id. at 107. 
170 Id. at 108. 
171 Id. at 106 n.4. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 108. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 107. 
176 Id. 
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firm may invoke the attorney-client privilege to protect internal 
consultations between an in-house counsel and the firm members 
representing an outside client when the subject of the consultation is a 
potential claim by the then current client.177  This Part addresses the 
threshold policy question of whether a firm should ever be able to assert 
the privilege against such an outside client.  First, Part III.A discusses 
situations where an attorney’s duty of confidentiality is excused to 
obtain legal advice about compliance with the ethical rules, or where the 
lawyer needs to defend himself against a claim.178  Next, Part III.B 
analyzes the different ethical and policy considerations relevant to the 
propriety of treating a law firm as its own client when determining 
whether the firm enjoys a privilege.179 
A. The Case for Granting the Firm a Privilege 
When an outside client threatens a malpractice suit, the law firm 
undeniably has substantial interests, both financial and reputational, at 
stake.  If the former client prevails in a malpractice action, the firm could 
suffer an adverse judgment in the millions.180  Even if the former client 
does not sue, unfavorable publicity for the potential claim can damage 
the firm’s reputation and reduce its future ability to attract clientele. 
The rules of legal ethics reflect that these are legitimate interests 
worthy of legal protection.181  In particular, two provisions of A.B.A. 
Model Rule 1.6 reflect the bar’s recognition of the legitimacy of the 
interests.  Rule 1.6 governs the attorney’s duty of confidentiality to the 
client.182  Rule 1.6(a) prescribes that the attorney generally has a duty to 
maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the client’s 
representation.183  However, Rule 1.6(b) lists a number of exceptions to 
the general rule.184  Rule 1.6(b)(4) provides that the attorney may disclose 
otherwise confidential information “to secure legal advice about the 
                                                 
177 See supra Part II. 
178 See infra Part III.A. 
179 See infra Part III.B. 
180 See VAIL & EWINS, supra note 3, at 14 tbl.7A (identifying fifty-two cases between 2007 
and 2011 when a client won $1,000,000 or more from a malpractice action). 
181 See, e.g., RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1078 
(Mass. 2013) (explaining the interests embodied in Rule 1.10); see also Chambliss, supra note 
2, at 1753 (referencing Rule 1.6). 
182 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2011); see Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Are Law 
Clerks Fair Game?  Invading Judicial Confidentiality, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 39 n.184 (2008) 
(discussing Rule 1.6). 
183 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011). 
184 Id. at R. 1.6(b); Stephen Gillers, Virtual Clients:  An Idea in Search of a Theory (with 
Limits), 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 797, 806 (2008). 
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lawyer’s compliance with these Rules.”185  Further, Rule 1.6(b)(5) 
explicitly provides that the attorney may disclose such information “to 
establish a . . . defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client.”186  Official Comment 11 states that Rule 
1.6(b)(5) extends to fee disputes with the client when the lawyer is 
attempting to protect his or her financial interests.187 
These provisions implicitly recognize the magnitude of the firm’s 
interests.  In the type of dispute that is our principal focus, the question 
is whether the former outside client can discover the firm’s own internal 
consultations about the malpractice claim.  In contrast, Rule 1.6(b) 
enumerates situations in which the lawyer has the right to disclose the 
client’s own privileged communications over the client’s protest.188  The 
outside client has a more intense interest in the privacy of its own 
communications.  If the lawyer’s reputational and financial interests are 
substantial enough to defeat the client’s confidentiality expectation in its 
own communications, there is all the more reason to conclude that those 
interests warrant extending a privilege to the firm’s internal 
communications in which the outside client did not participate at all. 
Similarly situated entities enjoy a privilege to protect their 
comparable interests.  A law firm is a business organization.189  It is well 
settled that business partnerships and associations can qualify as holders 
of the attorney-client privilege.190  Indeed, one of the leading cases 
following the majority view, Sunrise, recognized that point of law.191  
California’s statutory provisions are illustrative.  California Evidence 
Code section 951 governing the attorney-client privilege defines “client” 
as any “person” consulting an attorney for legal advice.192  In turn, 
                                                 
185 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2011). 
186 Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5). 
187 Id. at R. 1.6(b)(5) cmt. 11. 
188 Id. at R. 1.6(b). 
189 Sadler, supra note 10, at 867. 
190 See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1, at 557–58 (discussing the attorney-client 
privilege available to entities such as associations, corporations, and government agencies); 
Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1728–29 (discussing cases recognizing a privilege for in-house 
counsel); Gillers, supra note 32, at 107 (“It is settled law that the attorney client privilege 
protects communications between corporate directors, officers or employees and in-house 
corporate counsel.”); Sadler, supra note 10, at 866 (recognizing that the A.B.A. treats 
partnerships, corporations, and other legal entities the same under Rule 1.13);  see also John 
Hasnas, Between Scylla and Charybdis:  Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel in the World of 
the Holder Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1199, 1210 (2010) (discussing ethical issues 
regarding the corporate attorney-client privilege). 
191 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 595 (E.D. Pa. 1989)) (“[A] law firm, like other 
business or professional association [may] receive the benefit of the attorney client 
privilege when seeking legal advice from in-house counsel.”). 
192 CAL. EVID. CODE § 951 (West 2009). 
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section 175 defines a person as “includ[ing] a natural person, firm, 
association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation . . . or 
public entity.”193  Given the breadth of this rule and the substantiality of 
the firm’s legitimate interests, the RFF court found “‘no principled 
reason’” for denying a privilege to the firm for its internal consultations 
about potential malpractice claims.194 
B. The Case Against Granting a Privilege 
That, of course, is the key policy issue:  Is there a principled 
distinction between a law firm and a non-legal partnership that does 
enjoy a privilege?  The proponents of the traditional, majority view have 
urged two bases for recognizing a distinction.  The first basis for 
recognizing a distinction that opponents of the privilege rely on is the 
conceptual objection of treating a law firm as its own client.195  The 
second basis relied on is the ethical objection of treating a law firm as its 
own client.196 
1. The Conceptual Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client 
Several courts following the majority view have professed that they 
cannot understand how a law firm can at once be the attorney for the 
outside client as well as its own client.  As we saw in Part II.A, the 
McCormick court asked rhetorically:  “If the McCormick firm was the 
client, who was its lawyer?”197  The Sunrise court voiced the same doubt 
when it questioned how the firm as lawyer and the firm as client could 
be represented by attorneys who are members of “one and the same 
entity.”198 
However, this conceptual argument does not establish the logical 
impossibility of treating some firm members as client (the attorneys 
representing the outside client) at the same time that another firm 
member (the in-house counsel) serves as attorney.  In rejecting the 
argument, the Rowe court analogized to the law governing the privilege 
between corporations and their in-house counsel.199  It is true that some 
                                                 
193 CAL. EVID. CODE § 175 (West 2011). 
194 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1072 (Mass. 2013) 
(quoting Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 850 F.Supp. 255, 255 
(S.D.N.Y 1994)). 
195 See infra Part III.B.1. 
196 See infra Part III.B.2. 
197 Gillers, supra note 32, at 110. 
198 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 572 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Chambliss, supra note 2, at 
1728 (quoting In re Sunrise, 130 F.R.D. at 572). 
199 United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996); Sadler, supra note 10, at 860. 
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European countries do not recognize a legal privilege between a 
corporate entity and its in-house counsel.200  However, in the United 
States the law is to the contrary.201  Under domestic American law, a 
corporate client can have an attorney-client relationship with one of its 
own employees, that is, its paid in-house counsel.202  In 1915, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that an in-house counsel can qualify as the attorney 
for the purposes of creating an attorney-client relationship with his or 
her corporate employer.203  “At the present time, all jurisdictions within 
the United States, both state and federal, recognize the attorney-client 
privilege for in-house counsel.”204 
In the situation described in the preceding paragraph, the corporate 
entity constitutes the client while an employee of the entity, the in-house 
counsel, functions as attorney.  One natural person employee, the in-
house counsel, provides legal services to other natural person corporate 
employees, who personify the entity client.  Similarly, although a law 
firm usually serves as attorney for outside clients, the firm can don the 
hat of client and enter into a privileged attorney-client relationship with 
one of its own members, the designated firm counsel.  Here too one 
natural person member, the designated counsel, furnishes legal advice to 
other natural person members, the firm attorneys representing the 
outside client.  The existence of the artificial entity should not obscure 
the human reality that different natural persons are performing the 
attorney and client roles.  In a very real sense, there is a division of labor.  
Hence, logic does not dictate denying a law firm a privilege for its 
internal consultations between in-house counsel and the firm members 
representing an outside client.  If the privilege is to be denied, it must be 
done on more substantial policy grounds. 
2. The Ethical Objection to Treating a Law Firm as Its Own Client 
The second basis relied on by opponents of treating law firms as 
their own client and granting them privilege is ethical.  The proponent’s 
arguments and critiques of their arguments will be discussed in the 
following paragraphs.205 
                                                 
200 See 2 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 71, §12.2, at 1658 n.1 (discussing the approach to in-
house counsel and attorney-client privilege used by several European countries). 
201 1 IMWINKELRIED,  supra note 9, § 6.9.1, at 824–25. 
202 Id. 
203 United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). 
204 Joseph Pratt, Comment, The Parameters of the Attorney-Client Privilege for In-House 
Counsel at the International Level:  Protecting the Company’s Confidential Information, 20 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 145, 152 (1999). 
205 See infra Part III.B.2.a–b. 
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a. The Proponents’ Arguments 
The proponents of the majority view contend that there are such 
grounds, based on legal ethics.  They advance a formal argument as well 
as a more fundamental argument based on the policies inspiring legal 
ethical rules. 
The formal argument is that treating the firm as its own client 
violates the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct by creating an 
unethical conflict of interest for the in-house counsel advising the firm 
members representing the outside client.  A.B.A. Model Rule 1.7(a)(1) 
declares that an attorney may not “concurrent[ly]” represent two clients 
when “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client.”206  Model Rule 1.10 announces a general rule that when one firm 
member is disqualified from representing a client, the other members of 
the same firm are vicariously disqualified from doing so.207  The 
proponents of the majority view point to those two rules and argue 
along these lines:  The firm members representing the outside client 
certainly cannot directly oppose the client’s interests—as the outside 
client’s counsel, they are personally disqualified from doing so; 
ordinarily, a personal conflict of one firm member is automatically 
imputed to other firm members; if the personal conflict of the members 
representing the outside client is vicariously imputed to the firm’s in-
house counsel, that counsel must be deemed to be simultaneously 
representing and opposing the outside client; and the latter, in-house 
firm counsel therefore has a disqualifying, actual conflict of interest.208  
The Bank Brussels court encapsulated this line of argument when it 
asserted that “a conflict as to one attorney at a firm [the member 
representing the outside client] is a conflict as to all [including the in-
house counsel purporting to represent the firm itself].”209 
                                                 
206 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2013). 
207 Id. at R. 1.10. 
208 See In re SonicBlue, Inc., No. 03-51775, 2008 WL 170562, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Bankr. Ct. 
Jan. 18, 2008); RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1077–78 
(Mass 2013) (discussing and rejecting RFF’s argument that Rosenblatt should have been 
simultaneously representing the firm itself and “imputed[ly] represent[ing] RFF” (citing In 
re Sunrise Sec. Litig. 130 F.R.D. 560, 597–98 (E.D. Pa. 1989)); see also St. Simons Waterfront, 
LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 105 (Ga. 2013) (“This automatic 
imputation of one attorney’s conflicts to all other attorneys in the firm is the basis on which 
some courts have refused to recognize any privilege for intra-firm communications.” 
(citing Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse), S.A., 220 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)); Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1724 (explaining the denial of privilege based 
on the arguments for conflict of interest “by imputing the firm’s duty to the client to in-
house counsel as a member of the firm”). 
209 Bank Brussels Lambert, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 288. 
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At a more fundamental level, the proponents of the traditional view 
contend that the conflict rules are intended to enforce the firm’s duty of 
loyalty to the outside client.  Koen is an eloquent statement of the 
contention.  After discussing the formal conflict rules set out in 
Pennsylvania’s version of Model Rule 1.7, the court cites Sunrise and 
rests its decision squarely on the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client.210  
Faced with a policy choice between enforcing those duties and 
protecting the firm’s interests, the court stated that those fiduciary duties 
are “paramount.”211 
b. The Critique of the Proponents’ Arguments 
Although the proponents’ arguments seem plausible, there are 
persuasive responses to the proponent’s formal argument as well as their 
policy argument.  Professor Chambliss has presented a critique of the 
formal argument.212  In its 2013 decision, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court endorsed Professor Chambliss’s criticism of the 
traditionalists’ construction of the Model Rules.213  Her analysis 
convinced the court that in the typical case, it does not significantly serve 
either the firm’s duty of loyalty or the outside client’s confidentiality 
interests to “apply[] the [formal] rule of [vicarious] imputation to the 
representation of a law firm by its in-house counsel.”214 
She begins her critique by noting that the commentary and judicial 
gloss on the conflict rules demonstrate that those rules are intended 
primarily as means of enforcing the attorney’s duties of confidentiality 
and loyalty to the client.215  She explains that neither ethical duty 
requires the vicarious imputation of the conflict of the firm members 
representing the outside client to the firm’s in-house counsel.216  Her 
analysis of the confidentiality rationale for the conflict rules is trenchant.  
As she observes, the foremost rationale for the confidentiality duty is to 
prevent the attorney from disclosing the client’s confidential information 
to third parties.217  In her mind, it makes little sense to treat 
confidentiality as a rationale for the automatic imputation, since 
                                                 
210 Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 
212 F.R.D. 283, 285–86 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
211 Id. at 286. 
212 See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1724 (arguing for broad protection of communication 
with a law firm’s in-house counsel). 
213 RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1071–72. 
214 Id. at 1078. 
215 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1747–48. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
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affiliated lawyers in the same firm already have access to the firm’s files 
containing client confidences.218 
She also addresses the duty of loyalty.  She notes that the Model 
Rules recognize the firm’s right of self-defense—a right that would even 
permit the firm to disclose the outside client’s own privileged 
communications in which the outside client obviously has an intense 
privacy interest.219  As she writes, “the firm’s duty of loyalty to the client 
does not prevent the firm from attempting to defend against client 
claims.  This effort to defend is no more ‘disloyal’ when it involves inside 
rather than outside counsel.”220  Although there is merit to this part of 
her critique, it is not wholly satisfying.  While the firm has a right “to 
defend [itself] against client claims,”221 she glosses over the difference 
between the firm’s well-settled right to defend itself after the client 
terminates its services and the firm’s more debatable entitlement to take 
defensive measures while it still represents the client.  Intuitively, there 
would appear to be a distinction. To come to grips with that distinction, 
we must turn to the traditionalists’ more fundamental argument based 
on the firm’s fiduciary duty of loyalty to a current client. 
The traditionalists’ reliance on the attorney’s fiduciary duty is 
misplaced.  The traditionalists are correct in pointing out that when in a 
classic trust relationship, the trustee spends trust funds to hire an 
attorney to advise the trustee on the regular management of the corpus, 
the courts treat the cestui que trust (the beneficiary) as the real client and 
prevent the trustee from asserting the attorney-client privilege against 
the beneficiary.  In 2011 in the Jicarilla Apache Nation case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that generalization but noted that even today 
“[s]ome state courts have altogether rejected the notion that the attorney-
client privilege is subject to a fiduciary exception.”222 
But even positing the existence of the exception, the traditionalists’ 
analysis of the case law is incomplete.  The generalization they rely on is 
merely the starting point in the analysis.  As the Jicarilla Court noted, the 
origin of the fiduciary exception is traceable to conventional trust 
cases.223  However, many of the modern cases are Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) lawsuits involving the 
administration of pension trust funds.224  There is a wealth of ERISA case 
                                                 
218 Id. at 1748. 
219 Id. at 1753. 
220 Id. at 1748. 
221 Id. 
222 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2321 n.3 (2011). 
223 See id. at 2332–33 (providing a historical review of the fiduciary exception 
jurisprudence). 
224 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1.a(2), at 626 & n.97. 
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law analyzing the question of when the pension fund trustee may invoke 
the attorney-client privilege against the beneficiaries.225  The cases apply 
the fiduciary exception to the trustee’s communications with the trust 
counsel at the inception of the trust when there is a cooperative 
relationship between the trustee and the pensioner beneficiaries.226  
However, the cases recognize that at some point, it may become 
reasonably clear to the trustee that its interests have diverged from those 
of the beneficiary.227  For example, the trustee might conclude that the 
beneficiary contemplates suing the trustee for mismanagement.  Under 
the modern case law, when the trustee forms that belief, the trustee has a 
perfect right to hire counsel at the trustee’s own expense to prepare for 
any possible litigation; and the attorney-client privilege will shield the 
communications between the trustee and its counsel from the 
beneficiaries.228  Significantly, the privilege applies even though the 
trustee consults its counsel while the trustee-beneficiary relationship 
continues. 
The parallel to the intra-firm privilege issue is evident.  When in one 
way or another the outside client indicates that he or she may sue the 
firm for malpractice, the interests of the outside client and the firm have 
diverged.  At that point, under the modern fiduciary exception case law 
the firm may seek counsel to prepare for the outside client’s possible 
lawsuit against the firm.229  The Jicarilla case stated that an important clue 
to the client’s identity is the payor of the attorney’s fee.230  In Justice 
Alito’s words, “[c]ourts look to the source of funds as a ‘strong indicator 
of precisely who the real clients were’ and a ‘significant factor’ in 
determining who ought to have access to the legal advice.”231  If the law 
firm instructs its in-house counsel to bill his or her time investigating the 
malpractice claim to the firm rather than the client, the instruction is 
important evidence that the firm is the real client.232  In these 
circumstances, consistently with the ERISA case law, the firm may claim 
the privilege even against the person or company who was the firm’s 
                                                 
225 See id. § 6.5.1.a(2), at 626 n.97 (citing a plethora of cases on this issue). 
226 Id. 
227 See generally, Kirsten H. Jensen, The Fiduciary Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2007, at 31, 32–34, 40–42 (Oct. 2007) (discussing the fiduciary exception 
and divergent interests). 
228 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.5.1.a(2), at 625–26. 
229 See supra Part II.B. (providing case law on the growing minority view recognizing an 
attorney-client privilege for in-house counsel). 
230 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2330 (2011). 
231 Id. at 2326 (quoting Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 
712 (Del. Ch. 1976)). 
232 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1075 (Mass. 2013). 
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outside client at the time of the internal consultations.233  The upshot is 
that the firm has legitimate, substantial interests warranting the 
protection of the attorney-client privilege, and none of the traditionalists’ 
counter-arguments can withstand close scrutiny. 
IV.  A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE QUESTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
INTRA-FIRM PRIVILEGE:  WHAT CONDITIONS SHOULD THE COURT IMPOSE TO 
LIMIT THE EXTENT OF THE PRIVILEGE? 
Part III concluded that at least in some circumstances, a law firm 
should be able to assert the attorney-client privilege for communications 
between the firm’s in-house counsel and the firm members representing 
an outside client about a potential malpractice claim even when the 
party later seeking discovery is the former outside client.234  However, 
even assuming that an intra-firm privilege of some sort should exist, the 
question remains:  What should be its extent or scope?235  In what 
specific circumstances should the courts recognize the privilege?236 
First, this section argues which internal steps a firm should take to 
establish its identity as the client of its in-house counsel.237  Second, it 
explains what the firm’s external relations with the outside client should 
entail.238 
A. The Internal Steps the Firm Should Take to Establish Its Identity as the 
Client of Its In-House Counsel 
In the 2013 Georgia and Massachusetts decisions, the state supreme 
courts underscored that the firm ought to implement procedures to 
ensure that both the firm’s in-house counsel and the firm members 
representing the outside client understand that the client of the in-house 
counsel is the firm itself.239  The firm must put in place appropriate 
structural arrangements.240  Admittedly, both decisions are so recent that 
                                                 
233 E.g., id. 
234 See sufra Part III. 
235 See Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1748 (suggesting that the scope of the in-firm privilege 
“vis-à-vis current clients should turn on the facts of the representation at issue”); Sadler, 
supra note 10, at 873 (“Rowe leaves unanswered the question as to the extent of the privilege 
when the communication directly related to the client who is seeking discovery.”). 
236 See Sadler, supra note 10, at 867–68 (expounding on this question). 
237 See infra Part IV.A. 
238 See infra Part IV.B. 
239 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 
104–05 (Ga. 2013); RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1071–
72 (Mass. 2013). 
240 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1745–50 (discussing courts’ treatment of this issue and 
proposing a structural approach). 
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it would be premature to predict the final form of the required 
procedures and structures.  However, both courts expressed relatively 
strong preferences on four structural arrangements. 
First, the firm should formally or informally designate the in-house 
counsel as the attorney whom firm members are to consult about ethical 
problems such as potential malpractice claims by current clients.241  It 
would be ideal if the firm formalized the counsel’s role by (1) selecting 
an attorney to serve in the role in a permanent, full-time basis with no 
outside practice; and (2) giving the attorney a title signaling his or her 
special role.242  The next best arrangement would be to designate an 
attorney who serves as firm counsel on a part-time but ongoing basis.243  
However, a court might be willing to extend the privilege even when the 
attorney was designated on an ad hoc basis,244 as the San Diego firm 
appointed the two associates in United States v. Rowe.245  In Rowe, Rowe 
appointed the two associates to investigate the alleged mishandling of 
client funds even though they had never before functioned as counsel for 
the firm.246  Nevertheless, Judge Kozinski characterized them as 
“effectively . . . in-house counsel.”247  However, as a practical matter a 
court is much more likely to find an affirmative understanding that the 
in-house attorney’s client was the firm itself when the firm goes to the 
trouble to select experienced counsel and institutionalize a more formal 
arrangement.248 
The second procedure is negative in nature.  Before the time when 
the firm formed the belief that the outside client might sue for 
malpractice, the attorney in question should not have participated in the 
client’s representation;249 and once the firm forms that belief, the attorney 
                                                 
241 St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 104–05; RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080. 
242 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733. 
243 Id. 
244 Id. 
245 96 F.3d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 1296. 
248 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1733.  In a provocative comment on the draft of this Article, 
Mr. Mokriski suggested that there might be a stronger argument for recognizing the 
privilege if the firm counsel was an employee rather than a partner.  E-mail from Charles J. 
Mokriski, Prof’l Responsibility Proskauer Law Firm, to Edward J. Imwinkelried, Edward J. 
Barrett, Jr. Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal., Davis Sch. of Law (Sept. 19, 2013, 09:45 PST) (on 
file with author).  It could be argued that as a mere employee, the counsel would have less 
of a stake in the outcome of the potential malpractice claim.  Id. 
249 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass. 2013); 
Habte, supra note 7, at 1762. 
Imwinkelried: Preliminary Thoughts on an Attorney-Client Privilege for Law Firm
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
744 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
certainly ought not to participate in the representation.250  The in-house 
attorney is undertaking to advise the firm—a representation distinct 
from the other attorneys’ representation of the outside client.251 
The third and fourth procedural requirements flow from the prior 
two.  The third is that the in-house counsel should open a new file 
separate from the file for the outside client.252  After opening the new file, 
the in-house counsel should ensure that the documents for the two 
distinct representations are not commingled.253  In the words of the 
Georgia Supreme Court, this records practice “helps distinguish the firm 
as the in-house counsel’s client and the claim against the firm as a matter 
independent of the underlying representation.”254 
The fourth and final requirement is a billing practice.  Rather than 
billing the client for the in-house counsel’s services,255 the firm ought to 
assign a separate billing number;256 and all the charges allocable to that 
number must be billed to the firm itself.257  As previously stated, in its 
2011 Jicarilla Apache Nation decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed 
that the identity of the payor is “a ‘strong indicator of precisely who the 
real clients’” are.258 
If the firm adopts these four internal practices and both the in-house 
counsel and the attorneys representing the outside client are aware of 
these practices, there is a strong case that the firm itself has established 
its status as the in-house counsel’s client.  To be sure, subsidiary issues 
will arise as the courts refine the understanding of these practices and 
shape their final form.259  However, the major remaining policy question 
                                                 
250 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1732.  As a corollary to the in-house counsel’s non-
involvement in the representation of the outside client, the counsel should not share in any 
fee paid by the outside client.  Id. at 1745. 
251 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 
104–05 (Ga. 2013).  In another comment on the draft of this Article, Mr. Mokriski asked:  
“[S]hould the lawyers involved as targets of potential malpractice claims, who are 
continuing to represent the client . . . be privy to the advice of the firm counsel, or should 
they be screened from it[?]”  E-mail from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248. 
252 Gillers, supra note 32, at 109; Habte, supra note 7, at 1762. 
253 St. Simons Waterfront., 746 S.E.2d at 105. 
254 Id. 
255 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1080 (Mass. 2013). 
256 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1749; Gillers, supra note 32, at 111. 
257 RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1080 (“Because the law firm is the client . . . , their cost 
must be borne by the law firm.”). 
258 United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2326 (2011) (quoting Riggs 
Nat’l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712 (Del. Ch. 1976)); see E-mail 
from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248 (questioning the realism of the condition, since 
“[c]ompensation setting for partners in law firms is so complex and arbitrary that it is 
difficult to trace client fee revenues to any member of the firm.”). 
259 See generally E-mail from Charles J. Mokriski, supra note 248 (identifying several of 
those questions). 
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becomes whether, in its external relations with the outside client, the 
firm has conducted itself in a manner that justifies requiring the outside 
client to respect the firm’s internal confidential consultations.  Part IV.B 
turns to that question.260 
B. The Firm’s External Relations with the Outside Client 
Just as there is general consensus on the internal procedures that the 
firm should follow to claim an intra-firm privilege, there is agreement on 
some of the things the firm must do to fulfill its professional 
responsibilities to the outside client.  To begin, if the client does not 
realize that an event has occurred that may give rise to a malpractice 
claim against the firm, the firm must notify the client of the existence of 
the potential claim.261  Of course, when the firm makes this disclosure to 
the outside client, the firm should also explain that the client has the 
right to consult independent counsel about the validity and pursuit of 
the potential claim.262 
However, there the consensus ends.  At this point, the troublesome 
question arises:  Before consulting in-house counsel about the claims 
(and becoming entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege), must the 
firm seek and obtain the outside client’s consent to the firm’s internal 
consultations about a defense against the potential claim?  That question 
is reducible to two sub-issues.263 
1. If It Becomes Clear that the Outside Client May Sue the Firm for 
Malpractice, Does that Development Ipso Facto Create an Actual 
Conflict of Interest Requiring the Firm to Obtain the Client’s Consent 
Before Conducting Internal Consultations Between the Attorneys 
                                                 
260 See infra Part IV.B. 
261 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1754; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 20 cmt. c (2000) (“If the lawyer’s conduct of the matter gives the client a 
substantial malpractice claim against the lawyer, the lawyer must disclose that to the 
client.”). 
262 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20 (3) (“A 
lawyer . . . must explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to 
make informed decisions regarding the representation.”). 
263 See infra Part IV.B.1 (posing the question:  “If it becomes clear that the outside client 
may sue the firm for malpractice, does that development ipso facto create an actual conflict 
of interest requiring the firm to obtain the client’s consent before conducting internal 
consultations between the attorneys representing the client and the firm’s in-house counsel 
about the malpractice issue?”); infra Part IV.B.2 (asking:  “If an actual conflict of interest 
arises but the firm fails to obtain the outside client’s consent to internal consultations about 
the potential malpractice claim, does the failure preclude the firm from later claiming an 
attorney-client privilege covering the consultations?”). 
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Representing the Client and the Firm’s In-House Counsel About the 
Malpractice Issue? 
One of the recurring themes in the cases advocating the traditional, 
majority view is that when the outside client indicates that it 
contemplates suing the firm for malpractice, an actual conflict of interest 
arises between the client and the firm.  The Koen decision is a case in 
point.  Early in the opinion, the court pointed to the conflict of interest 
rules set out in Pennsylvania Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7, 
modeled after the A.B.A. Model Rule.264  The court found that when the 
firm members representing the Koen company sought legal advice from 
“another lawyer inside the firm” about the company’s potential claim, a 
conflict arose that “vitiated” any privilege claim by the firm.265  Likewise, 
the earlier Sunrise court relied on Rule 1.7 as an essential premise of its 
decision.266 
Given the central role of the conflict rules under the majority view, it 
is important to examine the precise terms of Model Rule 1.7.  Rule 1.7(a) 
identifies the situations in which a disqualifying conflict exists.  The 
current version of Rule 1.7(a) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation involves a 
concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent conflict of 
interest exists if: 
(1) the representation of one client will be directly 
adverse to another client; or  
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation 
of one or more clients will be materially limited by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the lawyer.267 
The official Comments to Rule 1.7 elaborate on the meaning of the 
provisions.  For instance, Comment 6 explains that (a)(1) comes into play 
when the lawyer “act[s] as an advocate in one matter against a person 
                                                 
264 Koen Book Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 
212 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Pa. 2002). 
265 Id. 
266 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 560, 597–98 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Chambliss, supra note 2, 
at 1735–36; Sadler, supra note 10, at 872. 
267 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2012). 
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the lawyer represents in some other matter.”268  Comment 8 elaborates 
on (a)(2): 
Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of 
interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s 
ability to consider, recommend or carry out an 
appropriate course of action for the client will be 
materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other 
responsibilities or interests.  For example, a lawyer 
asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a 
joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the 
lawyer’s ability to recommend or advocate all possible 
positions that each might take because of the lawyer’s 
duty of loyalty to the others.  The conflict in effect 
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available 
to the client.  The mere possibility of subsequent harm 
does not itself require disclosure and consent.  The 
critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in 
interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will 
materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent 
professional judgment in considering alternatives or 
foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be 
pursued on behalf of the client.269 
Commenting on the definition of conflict of interest in the analogous 
Sixth Amendment context, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
stated that the key to finding a conflict is identifying a plausible 
alternative strategy that the competing interest might prompt the 
attorney not to pursue.270 
How do the conflict rules apply to the scenario in which the outside 
client is threatening to sue or suing the firm for malpractice?  If the 
outside client has already filed a malpractice lawsuit against the firm, 
there certainly is an actual conflict of interest between the outside client 
and the firm under Rule 1.7(a)(1); they are the named, opposing plaintiff 
and defendant in the same lawsuit. 
However, when the outside client has not yet filed suit but has 
threatened to sue, Rule 1.7(a)(2) does not dictate the conclusion that there 
is already a conflict.  Assume, for example, that the outside client 
                                                 
268 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 6. 
269 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 8. 
270 Plunk v. Hobbs, 719 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d 
784, 790 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
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expresses its dissatisfaction with the firm’s services very late in the 
representation—after pretrial discovery has closed, after trial has been 
scheduled, after the judge has entered his or her pretrial order including 
the parties’ final stipulations, after the two sides have submitted their 
formal witnesses lists, and after the opposition has indicated that it is no 
longer interested in pursuing settlement negotiations.271  The outside 
client’s grumbling undeniably creates a tension between the client and 
the firm, but in the words of Comment 8 “the critical question[]” is 
whether the firm’s concern about the malpractice claim could affect its 
“professional judgment in considering alternative[]” strategies.272  At this 
late point in the litigation, the firm may have no alternatives; as a 
practical matter the firm is locked into a theory of the case and a set of 
witnesses with which to establish that theory.  No matter how explicit 
the outside client’s threat to later sue for malpractice if the firm loses, 
unless it withdraws the firm’s only option is to pursue its chosen 
strategy—to prevail on that theory of the case and hopefully moot the 
malpractice issue. 
The analysis becomes more complex, though, if the outside client 
raises the possibility of a malpractice action earlier in the litigation when 
the firm members representing the client still have a choice among 
alternative strategies.  Even then, though, there is not necessarily a 
disqualifying conflict.  A conflict arises only when there is a plausible 
“link[]” between the firm’s alleged neglect and the firm’s choice among 
the alternative strategies for representing the outside client.273  Suppose, 
for example, that the outside client contends that the firm was negligent 
in preparing to depose an opposing expert.  The client asserts that the 
firm attorneys deposing the expert were woefully unprepared and 
wasted the time and money attributable to the deposition.  However, the 
opposing litigant later announces that it does not intend to call that 
expert at trial.  The outside client may have a malpractice claim against 
the firm to recover the fees paid in connection with the deposition, and 
the client’s threat to press the claim unquestionably introduces an 
element of tension in the relationship between the client and the firm.  
Yet, since that expert will not appear at trial, it is hard to see how that 
tension can influence the firm’s selection of strategies or tactics for 
representing the client.  Tension or not, without more there does not 
appear to be a disqualifying conflict under Model Rule 1.7(a)(2). 
                                                 
271 E.g., Breezevale, Ltd. v. Dickinson, 759 A.2d 627, 631–32 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated, 769 
A.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2001). 
272 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 8 (2012). 
273 Plunk, 719 F.3d at 981 (quoting Noe v. United States, 601 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
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However, varying the facts again, now suppose that the opposing 
litigant does not withdraw the expert.  Rather, as trial approaches, it 
becomes evident that the opposition views that expert as its star witness.  
Moreover, assume that on the eve of trial, the firm realizes that there are 
several different ways of attempting to undermine the expert’s 
testimony.274  One of the possible modes of attack is the type of 
impeachment that the firm used unsuccessfully at the expert’s pretrial 
deposition.  Again, the outside client has indicated that it believes that 
the firm attorneys representing the client were inadequately prepared to 
develop that impeachment at the deposition.  Given the threat of the 
malpractice claim, the firm might be tempted to resort to that 
impeachment at trial to show that even if the attack were fully 
developed, it would not undercut the expert; if the record demonstrated 
that, the malpractice claim would lack merit.  At trial, the firm attorneys 
could combine that mode of impeachment with other attacks on the 
expert’s testimony, which they believe could succeed.  In any event, in 
this variation of the scenario, the spectre of the malpractice lawsuit 
might influence the firm’s choice among alternative strategies and could, 
thus, create a genuine conflict of interest.  At the very least, that 
possibility could impact the attorney’s advice concerning the advisability 
of settlement.275 
2. If an Actual Conflict of Interest Arises but the Firm Fails to Obtain 
the Outside Client’s Consent to Internal Consultations About the 
Potential Malpractice Claim, Does the Failure Preclude the Firm 
from Later Claiming an Attorney-Client Privilege Covering the 
Consultations? 
While Model Rule 1.7(a) identifies the situations in which the lawyer 
has an otherwise disqualifying conflict, Rule 1.7(b) states the 
consequences of the existence of a conflict.276  Rule 1.7(b) prescribes the 
requirements for the lawyer’s continued representation of the client.  
Rule 1.7(b) reads: 
                                                 
274 See generally EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE (5th ed. 2014) (providing a detailed analysis of the methods of attacking “the 
admissibility, weight, and legal sufficiency of opposing expert testimony”). 
275 See, e.g., Breezevale Ltd., 759 A.2d at 632 (setting forth the client’s argument that 
advising settlement without informing the client of the firm’s conflict of interest constituted 
malpractice). 
276 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2012) (providing instances where an 
attorney may represent a client despite a concurrent conflict); supra text accompanying note 
267 (setting forth the text of Rule 1.7(a)). 
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Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of 
interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a 
client if: 
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be 
able to provide competent and diligent representation to 
each affected client; 
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law; 
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a 
claim by one client against another client represented by 
the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding 
before a tribunal; and 
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing.277 
Rule 1.7(b)(2) and (3) do not require extended comment.  Without 
more, (b)(2) does not apply in the situation in which the outside client 
has indicated that it might later sue the firm for malpractice, as 
Comment 16 to Rule 1.7 explains that (b)(2) applies only in extreme 
situations such as when a lawyer seeks to represent more than one 
defendant in a capital case.278 
Similarly, (b)(3) is inapposite.  In the words of Comment 17, at the 
point when the outside client threatens, but has not filed a claim, the 
outside client and firm are not yet “aligned directly against each other in 
the same litigation or other proceeding.”279  For that matter, consistently 
with (b)(1) if the firm “reasonably believes” that it can provide the 
outside client with “competent . . . representation” against the outside 
client’s opponent, even that provision does not bar the firm’s continued 
representation of the outside client.280 
By process of elimination, (b)(4) emerges as the decisive issue:  Did 
the firm obtain the outside’s client’s express consent?  What exactly does 
the client need to consent to?  In this setting, the firm supposedly must 
obtain the outside client’s consent that the firm members representing 
the client confer with in-house firm counsel,281 and it must obtain that 
counsel’s legal advice about the appropriate course of action in light of 
                                                 
277 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(2) (2012). 
278 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 16. 
279 Id. at R. 1.7 cmt. 17. 
280 Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1). 
281 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1746, 1752; see RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, 
LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Mass. 2013) (presenting the outside client’s argument to that 
effect). 
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the threatened malpractice claim.282  Given the asserted requirement for 
consent, several practical and legal issues arise. 
After concluding that the firm might have committed malpractice, 
why might the outside client want the firm to continue to represent the 
client?  The lawyer-client relationship is simply one type of human 
relationship.  Persons and companies standing in relationships often 
decide to continue the relationship after encountering “bumps in the 
road.”  Spouses do so, employers and employees do so, doctors and 
patients do so, and businesses in contractual relationships do so.  Even 
after a minor breach by the other contracting party, a business might 
conduct a cost/benefit analysis and conclude that the long-term 
economic value of maintaining the contract far exceeds the paltry 
amount of damage caused by the minor breach. 
In this context, it is easy to conceive of realistic circumstances in 
which the outside client would desperately want the firm to continue the 
representation.  It could be a foolish, knee-jerk reaction for the outside 
client to terminate the firm as soon as the client concludes that the firm 
has committed an act of malpractice.  Assume that the law firm has more 
expertise at this type of transaction or litigation than any other firm, the 
firm has spent months or years collecting the facts and conducting the 
relevant legal research, and the hour is late—the trial is scheduled to 
begin soon, or the other party to the business transaction has signaled 
that it wants to conclude the negotiations shortly.  All those factors could 
pressure the outside client to favor the continuation of the representation 
by the firm. 
Even if the client consents, why would the firm opt to continue the 
representation of the client rather than seeking to withdraw and 
beginning preparations to defend any malpractice action?  At first blush, 
one might think that the path of caution for the firm would be to attempt 
to withdraw “at the first hint of a problem”283 and then commence in 
earnest preparations for any subsequent malpractice action.  However, 
by doing so, the firm would lose its opportunity to mitigate any harm to 
the client284 and thereby minimize the amount of damages it might have 
to pay as a result of any subsequent malpractice judgment.  In many, if 
not most, cases, the firm can render the malpractice issue moot by 
achieving a favorable outcome for the client in the transaction or 
litigation.  Especially if the firm has special expertise in the area and has 
already devoted months or years to assembling the relevant facts, the 
                                                 
282 See RFF Family P’ship, 991 N.E.2d at 1072 (discussing the importance of such 
communication). 
283 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1747. 
284 Id. 
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firm might quite sensibly conclude that it is in a much better position 
than any other law firm to achieve a successful result for the client. 
The interplay of the practical consideration described in the 
preceding three paragraphs ultimately leads to the decisive legal issue:  
If (1) the outside client does not terminate the firm but withholds consent 
to the firm’s in-house consultations; and (2) the firm does not withdraw 
and decides to conduct the in-house consultations, does the client’s lack 
of consent preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to the 
consultations?  In this variation of the situation, will the firm altogether 
forego any privilege if the firm decides to conduct the consultations 
despite the client’s refusal to consent?285  There is a strong case that in 
most cases, the answer to that question should be no. 
Assume arguendo that the firm’s conduct constitutes an ethical 
violation of Model Rule 1.7(b).  As the Georgia Supreme Court noted in 
its 2013 decision, the question of the applicability of the attorney-client 
privilege is governed by evidence laws, not legal ethics.286  In Georgia, as 
in many states, the history and text of the state ethical rules make it clear 
that the ethical rules “‘are not intended to govern or affect judicial 
application of . . . the attorney-client . . . privilege.’”287 
In passing, in their opinions, both the Ninth Circuit in Rowe and the 
Georgia court briefly mentioned the evidentiary doctrine that arguably 
controls here—the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client 
privilege.288  Unfortunately, to date neither the cases applying the 
traditional view nor those espousing the minority view have undertaken 
a thorough analysis of the applicability of that exception to this fact 
situation.  As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, most recently in 
United States v. Zolin, although the law hopes to encourage legitimate 
consultations between clients and attorneys, the law does not want to 
facilitate the commission of crimes and frauds.289  Consequently, the 
privilege does not attach when a client consults an attorney for the 
primary purpose of obtaining advice to facilitate the commission of an 
ongoing or future crime or fraud.  A proponent of the traditional, 
                                                 
285 Id. at 1743 (“If withdrawal is not possible . . . the firm must simply forgo privileged 
advice altogether.”); see Koen Books Distribs. v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle, 
Bowman & Lombardo, P.C., 212 F.R.D. 283, 286 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (refusing to apply the 
privilege because the firm could have withdrawn from the proceeding). 
286 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 
102 (Ga. 2013). 
287 Id. at 106 (quoting GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Preamble, ¶ 19 (Westlaw Next 
current with amendments received through 11/1/2013)). 
288 United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1996); St. Simons Waterfront, LLC, 
746 S.E.2d at 107. 
289 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989); see 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.13.2.d, at 1166–67 
(noting this tension). 
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majority view denying intra-firm privilege might contend that when the 
firm conducts in-house consultations without the required consent of the 
outside client, the crime/fraud exception applies, precluding the 
recognition of an attorney-client privilege.  In many situations, though, 
that contention will fail. 
To begin, most jurisdictions hold that, standing alone, a violation of 
the legal ethics rules does not constitute a crime or fraud.  It is true that 
jurisdictions vary in their views of the breadth of the exception.290  For 
example, while some states apply the exception only to fraud upon the 
court, most states extend the exception to any tort of fraud.291  However, 
only a distinct minority of states have expanded the scope of the 
exception to reach violations of the rules of legal ethics.292  Unless the 
facts underlying the legal ethical violation also constituted either a crime 
or a tort of fraud, the crime/fraud exception cannot be invoked to defeat 
a prima facie case for applying the privilege. 
To be sure, there are situations in which the facts establishing the 
legal ethical violation will also make out a case for fraud.  It is one thing 
for the firm to engage in internal consultations despite the outside 
client’s refusal to consent if the firm informs the client that it 
nevertheless intends to conduct the consultations.  It is quite another 
matter—and a fact situation which would arguably trigger the 
crime/fraud exception—when the firm members representing the 
outside client seek the in-house counsel’s advice as to how to conceal the 
consultations from the client.  As Professor Chambliss interprets the facts 
in Bank Brussels, there the firm attorneys representing the client 
“sought . . . [the] advice” of the head of the firm’s Clients and Ethics 
Committee “primarily in order to conceal the conflict.”293  She correctly 
concludes that this type of misconduct is tortious and fraudulent.294 
However, facts as extreme as those in Bank Brussels are presumably 
atypical.  In a run-of-the-mill case, the firm seeking to invoke the 
privilege can forthrightly inform the outside client that even without the 
client’s blessing, the firm members representing the client intend to 
consult with in-house counsel about defensive measures in anticipation 
of a malpractice claim.295  Of course, at that juncture the client is free to 
                                                 
290 See 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1170–75 (exploring splits in 
authority). 
291 See id. § 6.13.2.d(1), at 1172 (stating that the majority of jurisdictions construe fraud 
“broadly”). 
292 Id. § 6.13.2.d(2), at 1175. 
293 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1751. 
294 Id. 
295 St. Simons Waterfront, LLC v. Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, P.C., 746 S.E.2d 98, 
104–05 (Ga. 2013). 
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terminate the firm even if the client did not fire the firm earlier when the 
client initially discovered the possible malpractice claim.  Moreover, as 
the Georgia Supreme Court noted, it is conceivable that, although the 
privilege would apply to the consultations, the firm would be guilty of 
an ethical violation.296  However, there is no logical necessity for legal 
ethics rules to dictate evidentiary doctrine.  In its opinion, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deemed it significant that in the 
lengthy list of thirteen different judicial remedies for a lawyer’s breach of 
ethical duties in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, 
there is no mention of denial or forfeiture of privilege as a sanction.297 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There is unanimity that the members of a law firm owe a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to the firm’s outside clients.  However, “fiduciary” is not 
a talisman that makes the firm’s legitimate interests and rights vanish.  
The firm has substantial reputational and financial interests that justify 
the protection of the attorney-client privilege when the firm has made it 
clear that it is the client of an in-house firm counsel and the firm has been 
candid in its dealings with the outside client.  No human relationship is 
perfect.  It is to be expected that even after the persons or entities 
voluntarily form a trusting, cooperative attorney-client relationship, the 
client will sometimes conclude that the attorney has breached its duties 
to the client—even when the client decides against immediately 
terminating the relationship. 
To be sure, when the relationship continues, the outside client has a 
right to expect competent legal service during the balance of the 
representation.  Moreover, the client does not waive the potential 
malpractice claim by retaining the firm.  For that matter, while the 
relationship survives, the outside client is obviously free to hire a second 
law firm to begin developing the malpractice case against the firm—
which is precisely what SSW did in the Georgia case.298  No one would 
deny that SSW enjoyed an attorney-client privilege protecting its 
consultations with the second firm and that SSW could have asserted 
                                                 
296 Id. at 106 n.4 (“We emphasize that this opinion is not intended to resolve the ethical 
quandary and instead addresses only the evidentiary questions of privilege . . . .”). 
297 RFF Family P’ship, LP v. Burns & Levinson, LLP, 991 N.E.2d 1066, 1079 (Mass. 2013). 
298 St. Simons Waterfront, 746 S.E.2d at 102 (“SSW retained another law firm . . . to pursue 
potential action against Hunter Maclean; new counsel requested . . . that Hunter Maclean 
continue to handle the ongoing closings, which Hunter Maclean did . . . .”). 
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that privilege against the original firm, Hunter Maclean, in a subsequent 
malpractice claim against Hunter Maclean.299 
The key issue is whether Hunter Maclean should be entitled to a 
similar privilege for the internal consultations that it conducted at the 
same time SSW was developing its case against Hunter Maclean.  So long 
as a firm such as Hunter Maclean does not mislead the outside client, the 
firm has a plausible claim that it ought to be free to take prudent steps to 
protect its interests against the eventuality that a client such as SSW later 
sues for malpractice.  The firm should not be “without recourse” to 
protect its interests.300  In the long term, judicial encouragement of 
internal consultations between the firm members representing the 
outside client and experienced firm in-house counsel could result in 
improved service to outside clients.301  Veteran in-house counsel can 
provide the attorneys representing the outside client with an expert, 
more objective perspective that, in many cases, will redound to the 
client’s benefit.  The traditional, majority view, denying the firm a 
privilege, creates a significant disincentive for such consultation.  The 
emerging minority view, recently endorsed by the Georgia and 
Massachusetts courts, is an arguably defensible alternative approach. 
As previously stated, this Article offers only a preliminary analysis 
of these complex issues.  Relatively few courts have addressed these 
issues, and unfortunately in those opinions the analysis of the critical 
fiduciary and crime/fraud exceptions to the attorney-client privilege has 
tended to be conclusory.  The courts favoring the traditional view have 
slighted the case law permitting fiduciaries to claim the privilege when 
they sought counsel after their interests diverged from those of the 
beneficiary, and for their part the courts championing the minority view 
have skimmed the surface of the applicability of the crime/fraud 
exception.  Legal malpractice claims are too common and the stakes of 
the bar and its clientele are too vital to be satisfied with the current split 
of authority.  The hope is that this Article will help prompt a more 
intense debate over these issues—and a deeper exploration of the 
relationship between legal ethical duty of loyalty and the attorney-client 
privilege in evidence law. 
 
                                                 
299 By suing the former firm for malpractice, the client effects a limited waiver of the 
privilege; and the firm may disclose its communications with the client to the extent 
necessary to defend the malpractice claim.  See generally 1 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 9, 
§ 6.13.2.a, at 1142–51 (outlining the self-defense exception).  However, that waiver does not 
extend to the client’s communications with the new counsel prosecuting the malpractice 
claim.  Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 727 N.E.2d 240, 244–45 (Ill. 2000). 
300 Chambliss, supra note 2, at 1723. 
301 See generally id. (discussing the benefits of applying the intra-firm privilege). 
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